Since the 1st of June 2007 ACIPSS offers not only a weekly newsletter but also a biannual publication, called the Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (JIPSS). The first issue of JIPSS was unveiled at the fifth Working Conference of ACIPSS in Graz in 2007. Alongside articles concerning the three pillars of ACIPSS (Intelligence, Propaganda and Security) our publication also contains editorials, interviews as well as book and media reviews. JIPSS is, as above mentioned published biannually as well as bilingually (English/German). The magazine is free of charge to ACIPSS members (included in the membership fee) while for non-members it is possible to obtain individual issues.
Here you can read a review of our journal by Sönke Neitzel, published on H-SOZ-U-KULT. Moreover, you can find a selection of articles published in JIPSS Vol. 4, No. 1/2010.
In the late 19th century the identification of persons by public authorities underwent a radical change. With photography, anthropometry and dactyloscopy, techniques appeared which promised a non-ambiguous and exact identification of criminal offenders and suspects. The basic principle of this technicised identification process was the classification, sorting and storing of the data-collection created by identification techniques, which were part of the new technical and scientific arrangement of police work. This article deals with the question of how the official registration of individuals worked and how identification techniques were negotiated and implemented, for which the example of “Volksdaktyloskopie” (general dactyloscopy) is used. “Volksdaktyloskopie” refers to the idea of taking and recording the fingerprints of the entire population. Many criminalists, such as Alphonse Bertillon or Robert Heindl, expressed their vision of extending dactyloscopy.
On the other hand, police record departments have stored fingerprints of second offenders and asylum seekers since 1902. And that still is the current situation with the Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) for convicts and the EURODAC-System for asylum seekers. The “Volksdaktyloskopie” could not be realized yet. A historical perspective of identification techniques demonstrates that extension and resistance are basic elements of the (ongoing) surveillance debates.
In the beginning of the 1980’s, a wave of hysteria cascaded across the NATO signatories as revelations of the existence of a special, elite arm of the GRU came to light: namely, the airborne infiltration and special duties force, the Spetsnaz. Several factors contributed to the panic, the first of which was the use of Spetsnaz troops to spearhead the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan as well as their prominent role in the “Counter-revolution” afterwards. Another factor was the defection of former GRU officer, Vladimir Rezun (Pseudonym: Viktor Suvorov) in 1978, coupled with his publication on the strength and capabilities of the Warsaw Pact armed forces (including the Spetsnaz). As a result of this, one can even trace the development of the Reagan doctrine, and the principle of “Low Intensity Conflicts” directly to the perceived danger which the Spetsnaz posed.
However, Spetsnaz had/has existed long before the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and their history can be traced as far back as to the late 1950’s. Their creation is woven intricately into the “one-offs manship” of the Cold War and the NATO stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Spetsnaz forces were to be used to perform seek and destroy missions on these facilities, making them unusable rendering one of NATO’s most severe deterrents against the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces useless. From this purpose, evolved the doctrine of using Spetsnaz as asymmetrical warfare specialists behind the lines (in a supposed NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict) even further and as time went on, Spetsnaz forces were trained for a variety of missions as well as uses.
In this article, a history of the Spetsnaz is given, as well an overview of their organizational structure, recruitment tactics, training methods, and equipment. One focal point is their use in Afghanistan, in which the case is made that in this conflict, they (the Spetsnaz) were surprisingly well-equipped, effective and even, innovative in the face an elusive and unknown enemy (in opposition to the majority of Soviet forces deployed during the conflict) . Finally, this article addresses the demobilization which occurred after the end of the Soviet Union. A link is established here between the drawing down of the Spetsnaz and the rise (and violence/skill) of organized crime within Russia.
On the night of February 25/26th 1971, Dr. Karl Erwin Lichtenecker, an employee of the Federal Press Service in the Chancellery, was arrested by the Austrian State Police. In the middle of September, 1971, following a lengthy trial, he was sentenced to 10 months of confinement, based on the breaking of the State-Security Law of 1936, as well as the Firearms law of 1967. He was accused of having had contact with the Czechoslovakian Cultural Attache in Vienna (who in reality was an Austrian Secret Agent) and of having passed off to him (in exchange for very large sums of money) documents concerning the political, economic and international (diplomatic) situation and stance of Austria (which were then supposedly passed on further to the CSSR Military Intelligence Service).
This article is based on the one hand around interviews conducted with Lichtenecker, as well as facts concerning the Verdict of the 15th September 1971, and on the other hand, information gleaned in Prague from the archives of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service concerning an agent named “Atasé”. From this, comes a highly ambivalent picture which at the time seemed to be all too clear: the convicted, who at the very least was partly guilty; the Austrian Court, which came to a conclusive verdict; and the foreign intelligence service, with which Licthenecker worked. This picture is however, all but too common for the situation in the espionage climate of the Cold War.
National socialist and right-wing propaganda have found their way into the World Wide Web years ago and so have computer games filled with racist, anti-Semitic and Nazi-glorifying elements. It is the goal of this article to give an impression of the multiple relationships between propaganda and computer games. Therefore, after defining the complex role of this relatively new media for both the individual player as well as for modern societies as a whole and after explaining how propaganda is spread throughout the internet and its communities as well as showing the limits of banning it by national law, several of these products will be described and analyzed on various levels. The focus is set on graphical elements, the acoustic dimensions, old and new ideological contents and of course the specific technical aspects of realization, which are important for successful computer games and effective propaganda. After this the main insights are presented on the questions of reoccurring elements, production settings and how effectively these games fulfill their tasks and functions of spreading ideology. Finally a glimpse on the major new developments in this sector is given, particularly on the trends of modifications,social impacts of multiplayer gaming and historical problems that may arise when replaying and altering the outcome of human history in virtual environments.